Description

OpenSite is an Open Source Content Management System powered by PHP5 and MySQL 4 and is extremely simple and lightweight.

We have discovered six vulnerabilities in OpenSite from authentication bruteforce to SQL injection. Except the first vulnerability rated at critical severity, the rest is of low severity.

1. Weakened authentication.

The function init in origin/libs/user.php checks for a matching origin_hash cookie. However, this cookie can be bruteforced in at most 2^32 tries for a known username. In reality, the number of attempts could be greatly reduced knowing that we do not have to check for time in the future, and long past.

2. Special characters such as quotes, double quotes, backslashes in password prevent users from logging in.

In modules/userregister/index.php, the argument passed to $user->register contains and escaped $_POST['password']. In origin/libs/user.php, this password is hashed with sha1. However, the function login does not escape the POST data before hashing it, causing inconsistency.

3. Double escapes in user registration.

In origin/libs/user.php, the register function escapes all key=>value pairs before inserting them into the database. However, username, password, and email have been escaped before being passed to this function. Therefore they are escaped twice.

4. SQL injection in admincp/includes/functions.php.

SQL injection in function haspermission. The parameters $module and $section are not escaped. This function is called in admincp/usergroups.php.

5. SQL injection in admincp/settings.php.

SQL injection in processing $_POST['do'] == "save". The POST data settings are not properly escaped before saving.

6. SQL injection in admincp/usergroups.php.

SQL injection in all permissions select command SELECT id,module,section,groups FROM permissions WHERE module='".$module."' AND section='".$section."' LIMIT 1". The POST data permissions are not properly escaped before use.

Workaround

There is no workaround.

Fix

These bugs are planned to be fixed in OpenSite v3.0.

Disclosure

Blue Moon Consulting adapts RFPolicy v2.0 in notifying vendors.

Initial vendor contact:
	February 24, 2009: Initial contact sent to Jack Polgar.
Vendor response:
	February 24, 2009: Jack replied asking for technical details.
Further communication:
	February 24, 2009: Technical details were sent to Jack, and confirmation was requested. February 24, 2009: Jack confirmed all problems and stated "most or all of them will be fixed in the next release". February 24, 2009: Prepared advisory is sent to Jack to co-ordinate the public release.
Public disclosure:
	February 25, 2009
Exploit code:	No exploit code is provided.

Disclaimer

The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Blue Moon Consulting Co., Ltd disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Your use of the information on the advisory or materials linked from the advisory is at your own risk. Blue Moon Consulting Co., Ltd reserves the right to change or update this notice at any time.